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STILL ANOTHER LOOK AT CAUSE
Satil Litvinoff*
The traditional set of ideas known as the theory of cause has had
a most eventful existence. It has been praised as the quintessence of
wisdom, deprecated as a truism, and blamed as a nebulous abstraction.'
It has also been made to reflect all kind of changing philosophies ranging
from the natural law ideas of the canonists, through the liberalism that
inspired the redaction of the Code Napoleon, the first Civil Code, and
to the socio-economic approach of some contemporary doctrine. The
outcome could be neither too clear nor too consistent after so many
historical accidents. Nevertheless, if no great satisfaction can be derived
from the notion of cause in its theoretical aspects, a different conclusion
can be reached if the focus is made on the functions performed by
cause in the practical life of the law.2
Besides consent free of vice given by parties with legal capacity the
law requires that, in order to be valid, a contract must give rise to
obligations with a lawful cause. That is so because an obligation cannot
exist without a lawful cause.3 On the other hand, the cause of an
obligation is unlawful when the enforcement of the obligation would
produce a result prohibited by law or against public policy. 4
In primitive law, agreements gave rise to an action only exceptionally
because a rule prevailed according to which no agreement was enforceable
unless good reasons were given to justify enforceability.' The opposite
view prevails in modern law where the basic principle is that agreements
shall produce binding legal effects unless good reasons are given to
exclude those effects. 6 At common law, lack of consideration is a good
reason to deny enforceability of a promise. In civilian systems derived
from the French, such as the Louisiana system of private law, absence
of cause, or unlawfulness or immorality of the cause, is a good reason
to deprive an obligation of its legal effect.
Copyright 1987, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
* Boyd Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 1 S. Litvinoff, Obligations § 242, at 439, in 6 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise
(1969).
2. Id.
3. La. Civ. Code art. 1966. See also La. Civ. Code art. 1893 (1870).
4. La. Civ. Code art. 1968. See also La. Civ. Code art. 1895 (1870).
5. See R. Pound, Interpretations of Legal History 54-55 (1946).
6. 2 J. Puig Brutau, Fundamentos de derecho civil, Pt. I 10 (1954). See also 1 S.
Litvinoff, Obligations § 196, at 354-55, in 6 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise (1969).
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In spite of emphatic declarations contained in principles such as
autonomy of the will and freedom of contract, the fact is that consent
alone is not enough to engender legal binding force. Something else is
required. 7 In the early stages of Roman law a promise was enforceable,
that is, it gave rise to a binding obligation, when certain formalities,
such as the stipulatio, were observed.' The question why was a person
bound could be readily answered at that time by saying that he had
made a solemn promise. Compliance with a formality accounted then
for the binding force of an obligation.
The needs of commerce, however, called for more, and perhaps
faster, ways of making promises enforceable. At a later stage, Roman
law held a party bound to perform his obligation whenever the other
party to an agreement had already performed his. Thus, the borrower
of a thing was bound to return it once the lender had delivered the
thing to the borrower. 9 When a party had agreed to render a service
in return for a service to be rendered to him, he was bound to perform
once the other party had performed his part of the agreement. 0 The
question why was a person bound could be readily answered at this
stage by saying that he was bound because the other party had already
given or done what he had engaged to give or do.
It can be seen that, so far, the binding force of obligations was
made to rest on an objective or material element, be it a formality
consisting of some sort of ceremony conducted in front of witnesses,
or an act of delivery or other performance by the other party. The
increasing demands of business and social intercourse, however, called
for even more, and perhaps more agile, ways of making promises
enforceable. In an even later stage, thus, Roman law allowed persons
to be bound by the mere fact of having given their consent." Perhaps
7. 1 S. Litvinoff, Obligations § 196, at 353, in 6 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise
(1969).
8. For a full discussion, see 1 S. Litvinoff, Obligations § 198, at 357-58 in 6 Louisiana
Civil Law Treatise (1969).
9. For a full discussion of contracts of this kind, called real because they started
with the delivery of a thing-res, see W. Buckland, A Text-Book of Roman Law from
Augustus to Justinian 462-81 (2d ed. 1950). See also I S. Litvinoff, Obligations § 199,
at 359-60, in Louisiana Civil Law Treatise (1969); cf. La. Civ. Code arts. 2893, 2910,
2926, and 3133; Jobard-Bachellier, Existe-t-il encore des contrats reels en droit franqais?
ou la valeur des promesses de contrat reel en droit positif, Revue trimestrielle de droit
civil 1 (1985).
10. For a full discussion of this kind of contracts, called innominate because they
did not fall under any of the categories until then recognized, see P. Girard, Manuel
616mentaire de droit romain 587-97 (5th ed. 1911); R. Leage, Roman Private Law 344-
47 (C. Ziegler 2d ed. 1948); 1 S. Litvinoff, Obligations § 200, at 361-62, in 6 Louisiana
Civil Law Treatise (1969). See also La. Civ. Code art. 1914.
11. See H. Jolowicz, Historical Introduction to the Study of Roman Law 301 (2d
ed. 1952).
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because Roman jurists feared some danger in allowing enforceability to
flow from mere consent, they expressed their caution in limiting the
binding force of consent alone to just four types of contracts, to wit,
sale, lease, partnership and mandate.' 2 The question why parties such
as sellers, or lessors, or partners, or mandataries were bound could be
readily answered, at that later stage, by saying that they had consented
to a sale, or a lease, or a partnership, or a mandate. In those situations
the binding force of obligations was made to rest on consent, provided
it was given to enter any of the limited number of contractual types."
It is not an overstatement to say that in the many centuries that
have elapsed since Roman times all contracts have become consensual,
that is, all contracts, with very few exceptions, can be validly formed
by mere consent. 4 It is as if the classic Roman category of consensual
contracts, originally limited to four types, was expanded to cover the
whole spectrum of contract. As a result of that expansion, for which
jurists of the canonist school take a great part of the responsibility,
modern legal systems of the French family allow private parties to bind
themselves by their consent alone provided that, perhaps as a remnant
of Roman caution, such consent is given- for a reason, or cause, and
further provided that such reason, or cause, is lawful.
A promisee, thus, may not rest assured on the basis of the promisor's
consent without more. Through the centuries that have elapsed since
Roman law came into being, the idea of cause, with increased sophis-
tication, keeps furnishing a firm criterion to determine whether an
obligation is truly binding.' 5
Some of the difficulties surrounding the idea of cause may be
overcome if the functions it performs in legal systems of the French
family are properly understood.
FUNCTIONS
Protection of the Parties' Will
Absence of Cause
If there is no cause, the obligation is as ineffectual as a Roman
nudum pactum.'6 In demanding a cause in order to give binding force
12. See W. Buckland & A. McNair, Roman Law & Common Law 267-268 (2d ed.
Lawson 1952); 2 J. Puig Brutau, Fundamentos de derecho civil, Pt. 1 15 (1954). See also
La. Civ. Code arts. 2439, 2669, 2801, and 2985.
13. See 1 S. Litvinoff, Obligations § 201, at 364-66, in 6 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise
(1969).
14. See 3 C. Toullier, Le droit civil franqais 316-17 (1833).
15. See 1 S. Litvinoff, Obligations § 242, at 439, in 6 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise
(1969).
16. 1 G. Gorla, l contratto 322-23 (1954).
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to an obligation, the law makes certain that persons have a reason to
limit their freedom by the bond of obligation. If there is no such reason
then there is no bond, and freedom from obligation is restored to the
person who bound himself thusly. The will of contracting parties is
thereby protected without encroaching upon their freedom, as it must
be presumed that reason governs human choices.
Thus, if at the time a contract of sale is made the thing which is
its object has been destroyed, it is clear that the buyer bound himself
to pay the price for no reason as he cannot acquire something which
no longer exists. His obligation then lacks a cause-therefore, it is not
an obligation at all.' 7 Likewise, the promise of a gift made in contem-
plation of a future marriage is not enforceable if the marriage does not
take place. 8 Here again the obligation lacks a cause as the reason for
the promise proved to be absent.
Cause is also absent when the obligation is contracted as the result
of violence or threats, or duress.' 9 Consent given in such circumstances
does not express the party's true will, as that will is being imposed
upon and no reason existed, therefore, for the party to bind himself.
A different aspect may be seen where one already bound by an obligation
refuses to perform it unless the counterperformance is increased. If the
other party consents in such a situation, the obligation thereby incurred
lacks a cause as he had no true reason to promise more in return for
a performance already owed to him. 20 It is different, however, if an
increase of the return performance is voluntarily offered by the party
to whom the performance is owed, as an intention to reward is a good
reason for such party to bind himself.2
The cause of an obligation may be only partially absent. That is
the case, for example, when the thing sold has perished only in part
at the time of the sale. When that occurs the buyer may free himself
of his own obligation if his reason for contracting it was to acquire
the thing as a whole, or he may accept a reduced obligation commen-
surate with that part of the thing that remains.22
False Cause
No obligation exists when its cause is false, as in the case of error. 23
Thus, if a party buys a thing believing it to be of a certain quality but
17. See La. Civ. Code art. 2455.
18. 3 C. Toullier, Le droit civil frangais 380 (1833); La. Civ. Code art. 1897 (1870).
19. See La. Civ. Code art. 1959.
20. Cf. Solomon v. Copping, 112 So. 2d 749 (La. App. Orl. 1959); United States
Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Crais, 13 La. App. 691, 127 So. 414 (Orl. 1930).21. See I R. Pothier, A Treatise on the Law of Obligations or Contracts 27 (Evans
transl. 1806).
22. See La. Civ. Code art. 2455.
23. See La. Civ. Code art. 1949.
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it actually is of a different one, his reason for engaging to pay the
price is false, and he is not truly bound. 24 The will of that party is
thereby protected as the law frees him from obligation when he does
not attain what he intended to attain through the contract. For the sake
of fairness, however, that result can obtain only when the other party
knew or should have known that acquiring a thing of a certain quality
was the reason why the party in error consented to the contract. 25
There is a certain conceptual proximity between false cause and
absence of cause. It may even be said that both result from error.
Nevertheless, absence of cause occurs when an objective element is not
there, such as a thing that no longer exists because it has been destroyed,
while false cause intervenes when subjective elements, such as beliefs,
prove to be wrong. 26
A false cause that results from involuntary error must be distin-
guished from an untrue cause voluntarily expressed in an agreement. In
the latter case, the obligation is still effective if another cause, true and
valid, can be shown. 27 Indeed, through a relative simulation parties may
disguise an intention to give gratuitously under the garb of an intention
to transfer for a price. 28 In such a situation the true intention, the true
cause, prevails, and an invalid sale may result in a valid donation if
the formal requirements are met.2 9
Failure of Cause
A cause may exist at the inception of an obligation and then fail.
When such is the case the obligation ceases to exist when its cause
fails.30 Thus, if a leased thing is totally destroyed during the term of
the contract of lease, the lessee's obligation to pay rent comes to an
end since the reason why he bound himself for the rent was to be
allowed the enjoyment of the thing, a reason that disappeared upon the
destruction of the thing.3" As in the case of the lease, in other situations
where the entire performance owed by one party becomes impossible
because of a fortuitous event, the obligation of the other party comes
24. See S. Litvinoff, "Error" in the Civil Law, in Essays on the Civil Law of
Obligations 222, 228 (J. Dainow ed. 1969).
25. See La. Civ. Code art. 1949; see also La. Civ. Code art. 1826 (1870).
26. For a full discussion see 1 S. Litvinoff, Obligations § 235, at 426, in 6 Louisiana
Civil Law Treatise (1969).
27. See La. Civ. Code art. 1970.
28. See La. Civ. Code art. 2027; McWilliams v. McWilliams, 39 La. Ann. 924, 3
So. 62 (1887).
29. See La. Civ. Code art. 2464.
30. See 1 S. Litvirloff, Obligations § 302, at 545-46, in 6 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise
(1969).
31. See La. Civ. Code art. 2697; see also La. Civ. Code art. 1899 (1870).
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to an end as the contract is dissolved.3 2 That is so because obtaining
his co-contractant's performance is the reason why the other party bound
himself, a reason, or cause, that failed-ceased to exist-when that
performance became impossible. The will of contracting parties is thus
protected as the law liberates them from obligation when, through no
fault of their own, that which they intended to attain through the contract
can no longer be attained.
A cause may fail only in part. Thus, if a leased thing is only
partially destroyed, if the reason to bind himself to pay rent was not
to obtain the enjoyment of only the whole thing, the lessee may accept
an obligation to pay a reduced rent commensurate with that portion of
the thing which subsists.33 Likewise, when a fortuitous event has made
a party's performance impossible in part, the court may reduce the
other party's counterperformance proportionally.Y
To determine whether a failure of cause occurred in a given situation
the nature of the contract involved may have to be carefully scrutinized.
Thus, if one party's performance becomes impossible, the cause of the
other's obligation fails if the contract is commutative, but not necessarily
if the contract is aleatory since the reason that prompts parties to bind
themselves through contracts of the latter kind consists in the expectation
of an advantage rather than an assumed certainty of that advantage."
Presumption of Cause
"An obligation may be valid even though its cause is not ex-
pressed." 3 6 There is, thus, a presumption that a cause is present in an
obligation.3 7 The will of contracting parties is protected by presuming
that they have bound themselves for a reason rather than forcing them
to prove that reason in every case. The freedom of that will is respected
through a recognition of the fact that lawful reasons are not always
disclosed in human interaction. Further protection is given to the parties'
will by allowing them to disprove such a reason. A principle that would
negate such a presumption would be less respectful of human initiative.
Protection of the Public Order
Unlawful Cause
An obligation must not only have a cause, but that cause must be
lawful, that is, neither illegal nor immoral, nor contrary to public
32. See La. Civ. Code art. 1876.
33. See La. Civ. Code art. 2697.
34. See La. Civ. Code art. 1877.
35. See La. Civ. Code arts. 1911, 1912, 2450, 2451, and 2456; La. Civ. Code art.
1898 (1870); Losecco v. Gregory, 108 La. 648, 32 So. 985 (1901).
36. La. Civ. Code art. 1969.
37. See 3 C. Toullier, Le droit civil frangais 381-82 (1833).
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policy. 8 A cause is illegal when it is forbidden by law.39 It is immoral
when it runs counter to the moral standards of the community. 40 It is
against public policy when it is contrary to values recognized as para-
mount by the community.4 ' As the enforcement of obligations with an
unlawful cause would produce results prohibited by the law, or repro-
bated by morals, or against public policy, the public order is protected
when an obligation is deprived of effects because of its unlawful cause. 42
This function of cause makes it a very useful instrument in the
hands of courts. Because of this function, courts in those civilian systems
where cause prevails are adamant in preserving it in spite of the dev-
astating attacks of writers who deny the usefulness of the idea of cause. 43
Through cause, indeed, courts are allowed, when necessary, to delve
deeply into the parties' subjectivity in order to uncover the unlawfulness
of the reasons that prompted them to bind themselves. In that way,
something like a policing of contracts takes place for the preservation
of the public order. 44 Here, a proper understanding of the matter requires
a clear distinction between cause and object.
Resorting to a simple example such as a contract of sale of im-
movable property, it can be readily seen that the object of the seller's
obligation is a performance consisting of transferring and delivering the
property sold to the buyer, while the object of the buyer's obligation
is a performance consisting of paying the price. Nothing is wrong with
such objects as it is perfectly lawful to deliver a house or to pay money. 45
Nevertheless, the reason that prompted the parties to bind themselves
thusly may be an intent to operate a brothel in the property sold. It
is that reason, that cause, that is unlawful, and therefore will deprive
the obligations of effect, rather than the object, which is neutral from
the viewpoint of lawfulness. 46
By the same token, the cause is illicit in obligations arising out of
a contract for the transfer of property made for the purpose of de-
38. La. Civ. Code arts. 1966 and 1968.
39. See Cahn v. Baccich & De Montluzin, 144 La. 1023, 81 So. 696 (1915), where
an agreement to stifle bids at an auction was involved.
40. See Baucum & Kimball v. Garrett Mercantile Co., 188 La. 728, 178 So. 256
(1937), involving a forward sale where no bona fide delivery was intended, but rather a
mere compensation for differences in the quotation of commodity prices.
41. See Succession of Butler, 294 So. 2d 512 (La. 1974), where the obligation to pay
a fee was made contingent on the termination of a marriage.
42. See La. Civ. Code art. 1968.
43. See I S. Litvinoff, Obligations §§ 236, 242, at 428, 439-40, in 6 Louisiana Civil
Law Treatise (1969).
44. 1 S. Litvinoff, Obligations § 236, at 428, in 6 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise
(1969).
45. Id. at 428-29.
46. See H. Capitant, De la cause des obligations 228-30 (1923); 1 S. Litvinoff,
Obligdtions § 236, at 428, in 6 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise (1969).
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frauding creditors. 47 The same is true of an agreement entered into for
the purpose of stifling bids at an auction. 48 An obligation to pay an
attorney a fee contingent on the termination of a marriage has a cause
contrary to public policy, and the contract where it originates is therefore
null. 49 The same conclusion obtains regarding contracts where payment
of a fee is made contingent on the securing of evidence leading to the
termination of a marriage.50 The cause is illicit also in obligations in-
volving the rendering of legal services by a party who is not an attorney.5
Even when object is at stake, its lawfulness or unlawfulness depends
on the reason, or purpose, for which it is placed in commerce. Certain
things, thus, may be regarded as drug paraphernalia when sold to be
used with a controlled substance, even though the same things are
susceptible of other and more innocent uses.12 It is noteworthy, in this
connection, that unlawful object and unlawful cause may appear together
in a synallagmatic contract. Thus, if things that are unmistakably drug
paraphernalia are sold, the seller's obligation is null for having an
unlawful object, and the buyer's obligation is null also but on account
of an unlawful cause.5 3
Nullity
An obligation with an unlawful cause cannot exist.5 4 The result of
any attempt to give rise to such an obligation is a nullity of an absolute
character. 5
The main problem in this area is whether an unlawful cause prevents
the existence of an obligation, and therefore of the contract where such
obligation originates, when it lies in the mind of one of the parties
alone, or only when it is mutual to the parties or, at least, known to
the other party. 6 For onerous contracts the answer should be clear.
French jurisprudence annulling contracts for giving rise to obligations
with unlawful cause usually makes clear that the reprobate reasons of
which that cause consists could be found in the mutual intention of the
47. See Gravier's Curator v. Carraby's Ex'r, 17 La. 118 (1841); Mulhollan v. Voorhies,
3 Mart. (n.s.) 46 (La. 1824).
48. See Cahn v. Baccich & De Montluzin, 144 La. 1023, 81 So. 696 (1915).
49. See Meyer v. Howard, 136 So. 2d 805 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
50. See McMahon v. Hardin, 10 La. App. 416, 121 So. 678 (Orl. 1929).
51. See Duncan v. Gordon, 476 So. 2d 896 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1985).
52. See A Better Place, Inc. v. Giani Inv. Co. 445 So. 2d 728 (La. 1984).
53. See 1 S. Litvinoff, Obligations § 236, at 428, in 6 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise
(1969).
54. La. Civ. Code art. 1966.
55. See La. Civ. Code art. 2033.
56. See 1 S. Litvinoff, Obligations § 236, at 429-31, in 6 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise
(1969).
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parties, or that one of them knew that such were the reasons that
prompted the other to bind himself. 7 In Louisiana, some decisions assert
that in order to affect the contract the alleged illegal intent must have
been mutual and that such intent in one party alone will not avail. 8
That approach shows concern for the interest of the innocent party
and also for the stability of transactions, but if followed to the letter
it may lead to undesirable conclusions. 9 A satisfactory solution to that
problem calls for a careful analysis of different possibilities which may
be better explored with the aid of a simple example such as the lease
of immovable property where, unbeknownst to the lessor, the lessee
intends to operate a house of ill repute from the leased premises. The
lessee, in such a case, cannot be allowed to enforce the contract if he
needs to disclose his spurious reasons for that purpose. Indeed, such a
disclosure would amount to an allegation of his own turpitude on the
basis of which he cannot seek the aid of the court by direct application
of the principle nemo propriam turpitudinem allegare potest.60 The lessor,
on the other hand, should be allowed to seek the nullity of the agreement
as soon as he learns of the reasons that prompted the lessee to contract.
To assert that, because of his innocence, the lessor can- seek only
enforcement rather than the nullity of the contract is not a reasonable
way of protecting the interest of the innocent party. 6' If, still ignorant
of the lessee's spurious reasons, the lessor seeks enforcement of the
contract, the lessee cannot avail himself of the unlawfulness of his
reasons simply because, if totally unknown to the lessor, the lessee's
reason for contracting might have been his motive, but not the cause
of the obligation for him deriving from the contract. 62
Criterion for the Classification of Contracts
Cause of the Obligation and Kind of Contract
It is noteworthy that, in most instances, cause is the criterion for
the detailed classification of contracts contained in the Louisiana Civil
57. See Civ. Dec. 27, 1945, Gaz. Pal. 1946.1.88, involving a contract of lease where
both parties knew that the premises were to be used for the operation of a brothel.
58. See Conner & Hare v. Robertson, 37 La. Ann. 814, 818 (1885); cf. Mahood v.
Tealza, 26 La. Ann. 108 (1874).
59. See I S. Litvinoff, Obligations § 236, at 429-30, in 6 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise
(1969).
60. See infra pp. 21-22.
61. See I S. Litvinoff, Obligations § 236, at 429-30, in 6 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise
(1969). Further distinctions can be made according to whether the lessor learns of the
lessee's spurious reason before or after occupation of the premises by the lessee. In the
latter case the lessor can also avail himself of breach by the lessee according to La. Civ.
Code arts. 2710(1) and 2729.
62. See infra pp. 17-18.
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Code.63 Indeed, a contract is onerous because the reason that prompts
the parties to bind themselves is to obtain an advantage in return.64 A
contract is gratuitous because the reason that prompts a party to bind
himself is to confer a benefit on the other party. 65 Although the function
of cause as a criterion for classification can be more readily perceived
in distinguishing onerous from gratuitous contracts, it also operates in
other categories. Thus, when the reason why a party binds himself is
the reciprocal obligation incurred by the other party, the contract is
bilateral or synallagmatic. 6 When that reason is the performance of the
other party's obligation, the contract is commutative. 67 When the reason
that prompts a party to incur an obligation is to protect himself against
a risk that may not occur, or to procure an advantage that may not
materialize, the contract is aleatory. 68
It must be noticed, in this connection, that oftentimes courts avail
themselves of this particular function of cause in order to assert that
a contract is valid, though as one belonging to a category different
from that into which it would fall according to the cause expressed by
the parties. In fact, it is the sovereign prerogative of courts to declare
the true nature of. a contract irrespective of the name given to it by
the parties. 69 The following are examples of situations of that -kind.
Invalid Gratuitous Contract But Valid Onerous Contract
An act which, as a donation, is invalid for the lack of proper form
may be, however, a valid onerous contract. Thus, if a manual gift is
made of a promissory note signed by the donor, the donation is invalid
because, since such note is actually an incorporeal thing, a donation
thereof must be made by authentic act.70 Nevertheless, if it can be shown
that the note was given not with donative intent but as recompense for
services rendered in the past by the one to whose order the note is
made, or in fulfillment of a natural obligation, then the giving of the
promissory note, though an invalid donation, is classified as a valid
onerous contract." Likewise, a transfer of immovable property where
63. See La. Civ. Code arts. 1907-1914.
64. La. Civ. Code art. 1909.
65. La. Civ. Code art. 1910.
66. La. Civ. Code art. 1908.
67. La. Civ. Code art. 1911.
68. La. Civ. Code art. 1912.
69. See I S. Litvinoff, Obligations § 237, at 431, in 6 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise
(1969); Murray v. Barnhart, 117 La. 1023, 1031-34, 42 So. 489, 492 (1906); Howard
Trucking Co. v. Stassi, 474 So. 2d 955 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1985), aff'd, 485 So. 2d 915
(La. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct.'432 (1986).
70. See La. Civ. Code art. 1536.
71. See Barthe v. Succession of Lacroix, 29 La. Ann. 326 (1877).
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the transferee assumes an obligation to support the transferor is invalid
as a donation if not made by authentic act. Nevertheless, the same act
is valid as an onerous contract which is also innominate and aleatory.7 2
Charitable subscriptions are examples of the same kind of situation.
By definition, indeed, such a subscription is a gratuitous act and is
therefore invalid if made by writing under private signature rather than
by an authentic act. Nevertheless, since the satisfaction of some interest,
such as the promotion of education or the arts, can be said to be the
reason that prompted the subscriber to bind himself to give, that suffices
for courts to conclude that a charitable subscription not made in au-
thentic form is nevertheless an enforceable onerous contract. 73
Invalid. Onerous Contract But Valid Gratuitous Contract
Sale is, no doubt, the onerous contract par excellence. If no price
is paid, however, because the parties never intended for the price to be
paid, that onerous contract is invalid for the lack of one of its re-
quirements. 74 Nevertheless, if an intention to donate immovable property
can be gleaned from the circumstances, and the invalid sale was made
by authentic act, the invalid onerous contract is a valid donation. 75
Invalid Onerous Contract And Invalid Gratuitous Contract
An apparently onerous contract that is invalid for a lack of cause
in the obligation of one party may not be a valid gratuitous contract,
in spite of the existence of a donative intent, if the requirement of form
has not been met. Thus, when a promissory note is given for an alleged
loan but it is proved that such loan was never made and that the maker
of the note actually intended to make a gift to the alleged lender, no
valid donation can be found if the act was not made by an authentic
act.
76
72. See Thielman v. Gahlman, 119 La. 350, 44 So. 123 (1907); Kirk'v. Kansas City
S. & G. Ry., 51 La. Ann. 667, 674-76, 25 So. 457, 460-61 (1899). For a full discussion,
see 1 S. Litvinoff, Obligations § 102, at 174-75, in 6 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise (1969).
73. See Baptist Hosp. v. Cappel, 14 La. App. 626, 129 So. 425 (2d Cir. 1930);
Louisiana College v. Keller, 10 La. 164 (1836). See also J. Overstake, Essai de classification
des contrats sp~ciaux 198-99 (1969).
74. See La. Civ. Code art. 2439.
75. McWilliams v. McWilliams, 39 La. Ann. 924, 3 So. 62 (1887); D'Orgenoy v.
Droz, 13 La. 382 (1839). See also Stevens v. Stevens, 476 So. 2d 883 (La. App. 2d Cir.),
writ denied, 478 So. 2d 908 (La. 1985).
76. See Heirs of Cole v. Cole's Ex'rs, 7 Mart. (n.s.) 414 (La. 1830). Cf. Succession
of Miller, 405 So. 2d 812 (La. 1981).
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DEFINITION
Terminology
In the course of time cause has been defined in terms of motive,
purpose, end, or reason. 7 There is no doubt great similarity of meaning
between motive, purpose, and reason to do something. Even if other
words were added to the list, such as incitement or inducement, the
pattern of signification would still be the same, namely, something that
stimulates the will. Though subtle differences can be found in the words
listed, a shade of distinction is not a solid ground for certain legal
effects. 78 At first blush the word "end" seems to introduce an orientation
towards the future in the meaning of cause. It is clear, nevertheless,
that whenever the question of cause is involved, the contemplation of
the future only counts in the measure of its present consideration by
the parties. Because of that, compound expressions such as "motive-
end" have occasionally been used. In general terms, although laden in
many instances with future-oriented overtones, the word "motive" has
invariably recurred whenever the theoreticians of cause have struggled
for a definition. 79
Classical Theory-Objective Cause
It has been said, however, that not every motive can be promoted
to the superior category of cause. 80 Here is where confusion starts and
concepts blur.
If not every motive can be considered as the cause, then that motive
which is the cause requires some additional connotations, such as being
the "principal motive," or "determining motive," or even the "im-
mediate motive." Adding another word, however, still does not furnish
a guideline for drawing practical distinctions. Underneath these many
attempts to isolate one of many motives in a series in order to speak
of it with certainty as being the cause of an obligation lies the realization
that motive is something eminently subjective, and that it would be
rather dangerous to make the stability of transactions rest on the realm
of subjectivity alone. That justifies the strenuous efforts made to turn
cause into something objective. Such efforts warrant the question whether
77. See I S. Litvinoff, Obligations § 240, at 435, in 6 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise
(1969).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. See 3 C. Toullier, Le droit civil frangais 329-30 (1833); La. Civ. Code art. 1825
(1870).
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motives can ever be objective, a question never answered in the heat
of theoretical discussions."a
In search of objectivity, attempts at definition went so far as to
make of cause a mere abstraction. Indeed, for the classical theory, the
cause of the respective obligations is always the same in a given category
of contracts.8 2 In a contract of sale, thus, that motive of the vendor
that must be isolated as the cause of his obligation to give the thing
is to obtain the price, and that motive that deserves the same treatment
on the part of the vendee is, always, to obtain the thing sold. In this
way, there is no need to pay any attention to whatever is in the back
of the parties' minds. No doubt, the danger of subjectivity is thereby
avoided, but at the cost of rendering the idea of cause useless. Indeed,
that approach turns cause into something so objective, though abstract,
that it can hardly be distinguished from the object of the parties'
obligations, or even the object of the contract, leaving no practical
function to be performed by the idea of cause.8 3
Intermediate Theories-Anticausalism and Dualism
The uselessness of an objective cause, that is, a cause that is always
the same in obligations arising from a given kind of contract, gave rise
to the school of thought known as anticausalism, according to which
cause is regarded as an artificial notion the legal system can do without.14
Anticausalist writers are no doubt correct in asserting that an objective
or abstract cause can hardly be unlawful. Indeed, neither the vendor's
desire to obtain the price nor the vendee's desire to obtain the thing
can be unlawful by itself unless, of course, either party's subjective
motivation is explored in depth.
That school starts from a distinction between onerous and gratuitous
contracts based on the intention of the parties and explains the inter-
dependence of obligations arising from a contract by the fact that the
contract is onerous. On the other hand, if the contract is gratuitous,
its very nature explains that the obligation it gives rise to is not correlative
81. See 1 S. Litvinoff, Obligations § 240, at 435-36, in 6 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise
(1969).
82. H. Capitant, De la cause des obligations 25-27 (1923).
83. 2 M. Planiol, Treatise on the Civil Law, Pt. I No. 1039 (Louisiana State Law
Institute transl., l1th ed. 1959).
84. The theory of cause was seriously criticized first in Ernst, La cause est elle une
condition essentielle pour la validit6 des conventions?, 1 Bibliotheque du jurisconsulte et
du publiciste 250-64 (1826). Next followed 6 F. Laurent, Principes de droit civil frangais
145-237 (2d ed. 1876). It was Planiol, however, who enlarged and systematized the criticism,
becoming the leader of anticausalism; see 2 M. Planiol, Trait 61mentaire de droit civil
No. 1037 (1899). See also 1 S. Litvinoff, Obligations § 215, at 384, in 6 Louisiana Civil
Law Treatise (1969).
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of any other one. 5 Unlawfulness of an obligation, for that school,
emanates from its object and not from the so-called cause."'
In an attempt to overcome that criticism, and still preserve the
notion of an objective, or abstract, cause, a theory-has been developed
that asserts that cause is actually two-things. One is the cause that
means more or less the same as in the classical theory, an abstract
reason which is always the same for each category of contracts, namely,
the contemplated counterperformance in the case of synallagmatic con-
tracts, or the spirit of liberality, detached from every concrete motivation,
in the. case of donations.8 7 That is the objective meaning of cause.
Absence of cause in that sense prevents the obligation from coming into
being. The other is the cause -that appears as a subjective notion which,
besides the mere abstraction, incorporates into itself some of the parties'
concrete motivation. In other words, besides the cause of the obligation,
here presented as a sort of abstract and intrinsic motive for contracting,
the existence is asserted of a more subjective cause that is identified
with motives extrinsic to the act, motives that vary with each particular
person. The latter is referred to as cause of the contract, in contrad-
istinction to the cause of the obligation." It can readily be seen that,
in this approach, it is the cause of the contract that may be unlawful
when such are the motives of the parties or, in some instances, the
motive of one of them alone.8 9
That approach, known as the dualist theory of cause, which still
enjoys great popularity in French doctrine, is not without contradiction
in its foundations and finds no support in the language of the civil
code which, in listing the requirements for a valid contract, speaks of
une cause licite dans l'obligation-a licit cause in the obligation-and
not of a lawful cause for the contract.90
Be that as it may, anticausalism on the one hand and dualist theory
on the other are theoretical developments which clearly show that, devoid
of subjectivity, the idea of cause loses its usefulness.
Subjective Cause as a Practical Reality
A fruitful manipulation of the idea of cause, in sum, calls for a
recognition of its subjective nature which explains the need of exploring
85. See I S. Litvinoff, Obligations § 215, at 386, in 6 Louisiana.Civil Law Treatise
(1969).
86. 2 M. Planiol, Trait6 elementaire de droit civil No. 1037 (1899).
87. See generally 2 G. Marty et P. Raynaud, Droit civil, Les obligations Pt. 1 163
(2d ed. 1962). See also I S. Litvinoff, Obligations §§ 229-231, at 412-20, in 6 Louisiana
Civil Law Treatise (1969).
88. See J. Baudouin, Les obligations 188-89 (1983).
89. See 1 S. Litvinoff, Obligations § 231, at 419, in 6 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise
(1969).
90. See French Civ. Code art. 1108 and La. Civ. Code art. 1779 (1870), whose
original French text can be seen in 3 Louisiana Legal Archives, Pt. II 982 (1942).
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it in the sphere of motivation. The fact that not every motive can be
treated as the cause of an obligation is better explained in terms of
communication, or presumption, rather than alleged objectivity. Indeed,
that motive which is the cause is the one that has been expressed as
such between the parties, or the one that can be presumed to be the
cause under certain circumstances. 9' Parties are free to make manifest
or to withhold their reasons -for binding themselves through an obligation,
their motives to enter into a contract. If those -motives are expressed,
if the other party is made aware of them, then, according to the almost
proverbial expression, they have entered the contractual field-they be-
come the cause. 92 If no special motive is expressed, however, the law
will presume that the motive is that one which can be taken as a
stimulation for a person's will -in the circumstances that surround a
contract-making situation. Thus, if a person is about to purchase a
thing, he may state his reasons, or requirements, in the clearest possible
way, thereby making the seller aware of for what it is that he-the
purchaser--wants the thing. The buyer's motives are thereby commu-
nicated to the other party who now knows why-for what cause-the
buyer is willing to obligate himself to pay the price. On the other hand,
if the buyer does not state his concrete motivation, he will be deemed
to have been motivated by a desire to have the thing sold without more.
Thus, the cause of the buyer's obligation will always be his willingness
to have the thing, in every contract of sale, provided he did not express
a more precise motivation. Confined within such limits, as a general
presumption, the basic tenet of the classical theory of cause still holds,
but it is clear. that such presumption can be overcome by proof that a
more precise motivation of a party was revealed in the contract-making
situation .
A motive that is communicated abandons the realm of strict sub-
jectivity. Though it cannot be said that it thereby becomes objective,
it can be understood readily that it acquires a certain inter-subjectivity.
That inter-subjectivity is the guideline that allows courts to isolate the
motive which is the cause from the other simple motives that cannot
be elevated to that category. In the words of a distinguished French
authority, the limits between the cause and the motive lies in the measure
in which courts can scrutinize private affairs.9 4
91. See 1 S. Litvinoff, Obligations § 240, at 436, in 6 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise
(1969).
92. The connection between cause and the cooperation the parties owe themselves
reciprocally is expounded in 1 Venezian, Opere giuridiche, Causa nei contratti 391, cited
in 2 R. Demogue, Trait6 des obligations en g6n6ral 544 (1923).
93. See I S. Litvinoff, Obligations § 240, at 436-37, in 6 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise
(1969).
94. H. Capitant, De la cause des obligations 11 (1923).
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In sum, since not just any of a party's motives to bind himself
through an obligation can be regarded as the cause, but only that motive
that is either understood through communication or presumed from the
circumstances, "reason" is perhaps a better word than "motive" for a
definition of cause. 9 Indeed, "reason" alludes to understanding and to
deriving consequences from known circumstances, which is, precisely,
the process through which a court-as ultimate appraiser of the positive
or negative signs in human conduct-concludes whether an obligation
has a cause and whether that cause is lawful.
The importance of the inter-subjectivity of the motive, or reason,
that qualifies as the cause of an obligation can be readily explained.
The party who communicates his reason is asking for a certain coop-
eration from the other in order to attain a desired result. The kind or
amount of cooperation requested also serves as an aid in determining
which motive is the reason, the cause, that prompts a party to obligate
himself. 96 Thus, whatever motive of one of the parties remains outside
the other's ability to cooperate will not be regarded as a determining
motive, that is, it will not be regarded as the reason or cause.
That is all the objectivity the idea of cause requires in order to
protect the parties and the stability of transactions as well. 97
DETRIMENTAL RELIANCE
The Principle
After defining cause as the reason why a party binds himself, the
Louisiana Civil Code provides that "A party may be obligated by a
promise when he knew or should have known that the promise would
induce the other party to rely on it to his detriment and the other party
was reasonable in so relying." 99 The formulation of that principle in
the law of Louisiana requires some discussion.
Problem and Solution At Common Law
At common law a consideration is needed to make a promise binding.
That consideration must be given by the promisee to the promisor as
a sort of price for the promise. Moreover, it does not suffice that the
promisee give anything to the promisor. That which is given is a true
95. For a full discussion, see I S. Litvinoff, Obligations § 240, at 437, in 6 Louisiana
Civil Law Tretise (1969).
96. 2 R. Demogue, Traitd des obligations en g~n~ral 544 (1923).
97. See La. Civ. Code art. 1966 and comment (b) thereto.
98. La. Civ. Code art. 1967.
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consideration only if it has been bargained for as such by the recipient. 99
In many instances, however, a promise is made for which no consid-
eration is given, and the promisee, though the promise is not technically
enforceable, relies on it to his detriment. In a proverbial example, a
grandfather gives his granddaughter a promissory note and tells her that
he is giving her the note because he does not want her to have to work
for a living. The grandfather does not ask that the granddaughter give
up her employment, nor does he make it a condition of his promise,
which should be taken to mean that he does not request a consideration
for the note. Nevertheless, relying on her grandfather's promise, the
young lady resigns her position with a business concern. As is further
proverbial in situations of that sort, the old gentleman dies without
having paid the note, and when the granddaughter demands payment
from the promisor's estate the executor raises the defense of a lack of
consideration. 100
In situations of that kind an American common law court and, to
some extent, an English one also, will conclude that the promise is
enforceable because it induced the promisee's reliance and that reliance
substitutes itself for consideration. 10 1 In a slightly different approach it
is said, also, that in that kind of situation a promise is enforceable
without consideration.'02
Detrimental Reliance and Civil Law
Since, at common law, reliance either substitutes for consideration
or justifies the exceptional enforceability of a promise in the absence
of consideration, it could be said that, in receiving detrimental reliance
as grounds to hold a party bound by his promise, the law of Louisiana
is also indirectly receiving the doctrine of consideration. That, however,
is not so. In the law of Louisiana a promise is enforceable when it
gives rise to an obligation with a lawful cause and not because it is
supported by a consideration. Moreover, in spite of some confusion
created by imprecise language in the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870, it
is now clearly explained that cause is not consideration. 13
Why then reliance, it may be. asked, if there is no occasion for
detrimental reliance to substitute itself for anything precisely because no
consideration is required at civil law to make an obligation enforceable?
Indeed, if a party offers to do something gratuitously and another party
accepts, the result is a very simple unilateral and gratuitous contract
99. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 71 (1981).
100. See Ricketts v. Scothorn, 57 Neb. 51, 77 N.W. 365 (1898).
101. See P. Atiyah, The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract 463 (1979).
102. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 90 and caption to §§ 82-90 (1981).
103. See La. Civ. Code art. 1967 comment (c).
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that is perfectly enforceable since the existence of a lawful cause is
always presumed.' °4 If there has been an acceptance, thus, it would seem
immaterial whether or not the offer or promise was relied on by the
one to whom it was addressed.
In the realm of pure concepts such reasoning appears to be im-
peccable. Nevertheless, when pure concepts are confronted with the
reality of practical experience the objection loses strength.
Thus, when an offer is made to allow the use of a thing free of
charge, or to keep things in deposit free of charge to the offeree, only
very seldom do the parties take the time to execute a writing evidencing
such a gratuitous contract or take other steps leading the offeror to the
clear realization that he is now bound. Moreover, experience shows that
in situations of that kind only seldom is there a clear and unpistakable
acceptance. Of course, an acceptance need not be express,, as it may
also be implied from action or even inaction by the offeree. 05 Never-
theless, an acceptance thus implied very often gives rise to the question
whether or not it was reasonably communicated to the offeror. In all
those instances the fact that, in reliance on the offer or promise, the
offeree or promisee took action that would result in his detriment unless
the promise was enforced is the paramount fact that inclines the court
to speak in terms of a reasonably communicated implied acceptance that
concluded a binding contract. Thus, in a celebrated case decided by a
French court in the past century, quite exceptionally, the parties had
taken the time to execute a writing whereby one of them, an innkeeper,
promised the other, a stagecoach operator, that the latter would have
free use of certain space in the former's hotel for the purpose of setting
up an office to conduct business related to the transportation of persons
and goods. When the invalidity of such an agreement was raised by
the innkeeper now turned defendant, the court concluded that the best
proof of the binding force of such contract was the fact that it had
induced the plaintiff to rely on it to his detriment.' °6 In other cases
French decisions have asserted that an offer made to the public is
binding, in spite of its having been revoked, because plaintiff, a particular
member of the public, relied on such offer prior to, or without knowing
of, the revocation, and the party responsible for the offer should have
known that reliance would be induced by the publication.'0 7
In the situations just discussed French courts have arrived at the
same kind of solution that a common law court would reach through
104. See La. Civ. Code art. 1969.
105. See La. Civ. Code art. 1927.
106. Fellmann v. Mathebs, Colmar, May 8, 1845, Sirey, 1847, 2, 117.
107. See Bordeaux, March 11, 1858, S. 1858, 2, 669; Paris, Feb. 5, 1910, Gaz. Trib.
of March 1, 1910; Lyon, June 13, 1894, S. 1896, 2, 147, D. 1895, 2, 292. See also 2
R. Demogue, Trait6 des obligations en g6n~ral 140, 152, and 155 (1923).
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the doctrine of promissory estoppel. That should surprise no one since,
regardless of the names used, the idea of estoppel is not a creation of
the Anglo-American system of law. The Roman law achieved the same
results under a doctrine expressed in the formula venire contra factum
proprium, under which no one is allowed to ignore or deny his own
acts, or the consequences thereof, and claim a right in opposition to
such acts or consequences. 10
The Louisiana Jurisprudence
In a case decided in the past century the.defendant had attempted
to remove the remains of the plaintiff's ancestor from a sepulchre
belonging to the defendant's family, despite an earlier promise that the
remains would never be disturbed. The Louisiana court granted a per-
manent injunction to prevent the removal of the remains and asserted
that the principle of estoppel, often applied in controversies involving
pecuniary rights, does not permit the withdrawal of promises or en-
gagements on which another has acted. °9
In a later case plaintiff asserted that, in reliance on defendant's
assurances, he had incurred heavy expenditures in purchasing equipment
necessary to perform the obligation arising from his contract with defend-
ant and argued that the latter should have reasonably expected that his
representations would induce the substantial change in plaintiff's position
and, further, that refusal to enforce defendant's promise would result
in injustice. This time, however, the Louisiana Supreme Court rejected
plaintiff's contention and asserted that the theory of promissory estoppel
is unknown to the Louisiana law.110
That decision notwithstanding, Louisiana courts, held promises en-
forceable on grounds of detrimental reliance in other decisions. Thus,
in a later case, the defendant had promised to confine a cat for the
108. See 2 S. Litvinoff, Obligations § 94, at 168, in 7 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise
(1975); J. Puig Brutau, La doctrina de los actos propios 97, in Estudios de derecho
comparado (1951). See also J. Dawson, Gifts and Promises 188-89 (1980); Fuller & Perdue,
The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, 46 Yale L.J. 52 (1936); Fuller & Perdue,
The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, 46 Yale L.J. 373 (1937); Herman, Detrimental
Reliance in Louisiana Law-Past, Present, and Future (?): The Code Drafter's Perspective,
58 Tul. L. Rev. 707, 714 (1984). See also, very especially, Herbert v. McGuire, 447 So.
2d 64 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1984).
109. Choppin v. Dauphin, 48 La. Ann. 1217, 1220, 20 So. 681, 682 (1896). See also
1 S. Litvinoff, Obligations § 135, at 227-28, in 6 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise (1969).
110. Ducote v. Oden, 221 La. 228, 59 So. 2d 130 (1952). The decision was praised
in Smith, The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1951-1952 Term-Conven-
tional Obligations, 13 La. L. Rev. 236, 241 (1953). That praise is criticized in Herman,
supra note 108, at 717. See also S. Litvinoff, The Law of Obligations in the Louisiana
Jurisprudence 161-62 (1985).
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period of observation necessary to establish if the animal was rabid.
The cat, however, was allowed its usual freedom and it disappeared
before the required period elapsed. As a consequence, plaintiff, who
had been bitten by the cat, was forced to undergo precautionary treat-
ment that produced an injurious reaction. The court allowed recovery
on grounds that, while no initial duty was imposed upon defendant,
that party had given an express promise upon which plaintiff had re-
lied."' Louisiana courts have resorted to reliance in order to hold an
insurer bound even before the pertinent policy was issued." 2 Reliance
was found to be the basis to enforce an employer's offer of a benefit
plan at the employer's expense when the employee to whom the offer
was made, relying thereon, remained in the employer's service." 3 Li-
kewise, a pipeline owner's promise of payment to a vessel owner was
enforced on grounds that the latter relied upon the promise to his
detriment. 114
More recently the Louisiana jurisprudence, in a clear manner, has
traced the ancestry of reliance as basis for obligation back to the civilian
venire contra factum proprium. 15
It can no longer be denied that reliance has conquered a place for
itself in the Louisiana jurisprudence.
Usefulness
It is granted that wherever it is found that a promise is enforceable
on grounds of reasonable reliance detrimental to the promisee, the same
conclusion could be reached on different grounds such as the existence
of a unilateral gratuitous contract of an innominate nature. Oftentimes,
however, the difficulty of ascertaining the parties' intent or doubt con-
cerning those acts that constitute an alleged implied acceptance make
the conclusion questionable that a contract of any kind existed before
the claimant took action in reliance on the promise made to him." 6
Even where no obstacle lies in the way to such an assertion, one party's
reliance induced by the other's promise offers the advantage of clear
and concrete facts over abstract, and therefore less clear, concepts.
Indeed, the proverbial dynamism of business and social intercourse in
111. Marsalis v. LaSalle, 94 So. 2d 120 (La. App. Orl. 1957).
112. See Thomas v. Life Ins. Co., 219 La. 1099, 55 So. 2d 705 (1951).
113. Robinson v. Standard Oil Co., 180 So. 237 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1938).
114. Continental Casualty Co. v. Associated Pipe & Supply Co., 447 F.2d 1041 (5th
Cir. 1971).
115. See Hebert v. McGuire, 447 So. 2d 64 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1984); Sanders v.
United Distris., 405 So. 2d 536 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 410 So. 2d 1130 (La.
1981).
116. See supra p. 20.
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today's world seems to leave little room for the idea of a pure convention
consisting of an offer, an acceptance, and a lawful cause, regardless of
subject matter." 7
Detrimental reliance can perform its efficient auxiliary function not
only in the many instances already contemplated by the Louisiana jur-
isprudence, but also in others such as charitable subscriptions where a
charity's reliance on the subscriber's promise may be a grounds for
enforcement more persuasive than finding onerousness in a typically
gratuitous donation." 8 In the case of bids by sub-contractors, reliance
by the general contractor to his detriment can help in reaching the
conclusion that the bid was irrevocable for a certain time." 9
It is noteworthy, in this context, that the protection of induced
reliance lies at the basis of some new articles of the Louisiana Civil
Code such as those governing offers calling for performance as ac-
ceptance, and those allowing damages to be recovered by the innocent
nonmistaken party. 120
It must not be believed that detrimental reliance is grounds for
enforcement only in situations where a contract would be gratuitous if
there is a contract at all. Reliance may perform its efficient auxiliary
function where the contract at stake is a business, that is onerous,
contract. 2'
Reasonableness
As required by the Louisiana Civil Code, the promisee must be
reasonable in his reliance for the latter to become grounds for enforce-
ment of the promise. A promisee, thus, may not place his reliance on
just any promise. For example, if the promise exceeds the promisor's
ability to perform, reliance by the promisee would be unreasonable, as
when the promisor engaged to give something beyond his means. Reliance
is likewise unreasonable if the promisee attributes to the promise a scope
greater than the promisor, under his own standard of reasonableness,
117. See I S. Litvinoff, Obligations § 239, at 433, in 6 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise
(1969).
118. See Louisiana College v. Keller, 10 La. 164 (1836).
119. See W.M. Heroman & Co. v. Saia Elec., 346 So. 2d 827 (La. App. 1st Cir.),
writ denied, 349 So. 2d 1271 (La. 1977).
120. See La. Civ. Code arts. 1939, 1940, and 1952. See also Herman, supra note 108,
at 737-50.
121. See Coleman v. Bossier City, 305 So. 2d 444 (La. 1974). In Ducote v. Oden,
221 La. 228, 59 So. 2d 130 (1952), the court might have been reluctant to protect
plaintiff's reliance because of the business nature of the contract.
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could possibly have intended. 12 2 Reliance is unreasonable, also, if on
such basis the promisee acts to his detriment but in a manner the
promisor could not have expected from the promisee, as when money
is promised for the promisee not to have to work for a livelihood and,
in reliance on that promise, the promisee indulges in raising his standard
of living. 2a
Reliance is also unreasonable when placed on the kind of gratuitous
promise for the validity of which a formality is required, and the promise
has been made only informally. 24 In other words, a party should place
no reliance on his belief that he has entered a gratuitous contract when
the formality prescribed for the validity of such a contract has been
omitted. Thus, reliance on a gratuitous donation not made in authentic
form is not reasonable. 25 That instance of unreasonableness introduces
an important limitation to the use of reliance as grounds for enforcement.
That is so in spite of the fact that distinguished civilian authority can
be found for the proposition that reliance should be effective in situations
where a fair solution calls for circumventing the requirement of a certain
form. 2 6 On the other hand, that limitation may lead to the conclusion
that, as a paradox, more promises are enforceable when promissory
estoppel substitutes for consideration at common law than under the
wider and more flexible theory of cause at civil law. 127 Be that as it
may, the limitation may be justified by the lawmaker's prudence. Indeed,
a donation is a liberality that depletes the donor's patrimony. 2 Further,
it may involve immovable property. The cautionary function that for-
malities perform may warrant that reliance not be regarded as sufficient
to overcome the need for authentic form when such form is required. 29
122. That would be the case, for example, if in a separation agreement a spouse
promises to support the other without a time limitation and the promisee relies on the
promise, assuming that the obligation will be fulfilled even if the promisee remarries. Cf.
Lamb v. Lamb, 460 So. 2d 634 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1984), writ denied, 462 So. 2d 1249
(La. 1985).
123. See E. Farnsworth, Contracts 95 (1982).
124. La. Civ. Code art. 1967.
125. See La. Civ. Code arts. 1523 and 1536. Nevertheless, comment (f) to La. Civ.
Code art. 1967 explains that the article does not intend to overrule the jurisprudential
conclusion that a promise to make a disposition mortis causa is enforceable against the
promisor's estate when the formal disposition was not made. See La. Civ. Code art. 1570.
Comment (f) adds that close analysis of those decisions where that conclusion was reached
reveals that the promise involved was made in return for a counterperformance requested
by the promisor. See Succession of Gesselly, 216 La. 731, 44 So. 2d 838 (1950).
126. See I G. Gorla, II contratto 364 (1954).
127. For a full discussion, see I S. Litvinoff, Obligations § 280, at 497-99, in 6
Louisiana Civil Law Treatise (1969).
128. See 1 S. Litvinoff, Obligations § 99, at 167, in 6 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise
(1969).
129. See S. Litvinoff & W. Tete, Louisiana Legal Transactions: The Civil Law of
Juridical Acts 127-29 (1969).
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Recovery May Be Limited
Recovery by the promisee may be limited to the expenses he incurred
or the damages he suffered as the result of his reliance on the promise. 30
In other words, the court may not grant specific performance to the
disappointed promisee, but only damages, and, moreover, the court may
limit the damages thus granted to the expenses actually incurred.' 3' Of
the two traditional elements of damages, namely, damnum emergens
and lucrum cessans-loss actually sustained and profit of which he has
been deprived-the promisee may recover only one, and that at the
court's discretion.1 2 When the promise that induced reliance can be
viewed as an offer that would result in a gratuitous contract when
accepted, that limitation is consistent with other provisions of the Lou-
isiana Civil Code according to which an obligation with a gratuitous
cause is less rigorously enforced.'
When an obligation is enforced on grounds of detrimental reliance
Louisiana courts may, thus, adjust the extension of the remedy to the
circumstances of each case. In many situations recovery of the loss
actually sustained by the promisee, that is the protection of his restitution
interest, will satisfy the demands of fairness. ' 34 Other situations may be
such, however, that only specific performance will give adequate pro-
tection to a disappointed promisee.
Reliance by a Third Party
When the promise is such that its performance would benefit a
party other than the promisee it is foreseeable that the beneficiary may
rely on the promise. If such is the case the promise should be enforceable
for the same reasons that make the promisee's justifiable reliance a
ground for enforcement. When a contract contains a stipulation pour
autrui there is ample opportunity for that kind of reliance by the intended
third party beneficiary.' Even reliance by a third party who is not the
intended beneficiary of the promise may lend additional strength to the
claim of the promisee or of the beneficiary.
130. La. Civ. Code art. 1967.
131. See La. Civ. Code art. 1967 comment (e).
132. See La. Civ. Code art. 1995.
133. See La. Civ. Code art. 2937 for gratuitous deposit, and La. Civ. Code art. 3003
for gratuitous mandate.
134. See Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, 46 Yale L.J.
52 (1936).
135. See La. Civ. Code arts. 1978-1982. See also Muntz v. Algiers & G. Ry., 114
La. 437, 38 So. 410 (1905).
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THE REVISION
Definition
The Louisiana Civil Code of 1870 defined the cause of the contract
as the consideration or motive for making it. 136 The revision eliminated
the reference to the "cause of the contract" in order to make it clear
that cause is needed for an obligation rather than for a contract. 137
Indeed, if the contract is synallagmatic the obligation of each party will
have a cause different from the cause of the obligation of the other,
which makes imprecise the notion of a cause of the contract. The revision
also eliminated the reference to "consideration" in order to avoid the
confusion that results if that word is understood in its common law
signification. 38 Finally, the revision explains cause as the reason, rather
than the motive, why a party binds himself. That cause is motive is an
idea the Louisiana redactors of 1825 took from the work of Toullier. 3 9
Though that writer spoke of motif, he did so in the sense of pourquoi-
why an obligation is incurred. In that context, "motive" and "reason"
are practically interchangeable. Nevertheless, "reason" carries the con-
notation of something supposed to be understood, which may rescue
cause from the depths of subjectivity into which it is plunged when put
in terms of motive. Further, the word "reason" may enhance the role
of a court's discretion in ascertaining, ultimately, that which, in given
circumstances, appears as the inducement, purpose, or presumable motive
that prompted a party to incur an obligation. 140
Absence and Failure of Cause
Those articles of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870 dealing with
absence of cause and failure of cause are doctrinal in nature and contain
principles that are elsewhere expressed in the code.' 4' For that reason
those articles have been eliminated without intending any change in the
law.
False Cause
The reference to false cause has been eliminated from the basic
principles asserting that an obligation cannot exist without a lawful cause
136. La. Civ. Code art. 1896 (1870).
137. See 1 S. Litvinoff, Obligations § 239, at 432-35, in 6 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise
(1969).
138. See La. Civ. Code art. 1967 comment (c).
139. See 3 C. Toullier, Le droit civil frangais 378 (1833).
140. See La. Civ. Code art. 1967 comment (a).
141. La. Civ. Code arts. 1897-1899 (1870). Compare La. Civ. Code art. 1898 (1870)
with La. Civ. Code art. 2552; La. Civ. Code art. 1899 (1870) and La. Civ. Code art.
2697.
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in order to avoid contradiction with the principle that allows a con-
ventional obligation to subsist in spite of a recited untrue cause if another
and valid cause can be shown. 142
Detrimental Reliance-Place in the Civil Code
It might be said that it was unnecessary to introduce detrimental
reliance into the Civil Code of Louisiana because, in the kind of situation
where that principle may provide a solution, the liability of the offeror
or promisor is actually delictual rather than contractual.143 In other
words, a promisor who refuses to honor his promise on the basis of a
technicality can be regarded as inflicting damage to the other party
-because of the promise, and the making of a promise is no doubt an
act of the promisor, which clearly seems to fall within the scope of the
general principle of the civil codes of France and Louisiana according
to which whatever act of man causes damage to another binds that man
to make reparation.'
Such an objection can be readily overcome. It must be remembered,
in the first place, that there is no liability unless there is damage and
that in the situations here contemplated there would be no damage unless
the offer or promise is susceptible of inducing reliance, and the offeree
or promisee actually relies to his detriment. It is then the induced reliance
that would seem to give rise to the quasi-delictual liability. That being
so, even in a quasi-delictual perspective, the new article of the Louisiana
Civil Code formulates a mere rule clearly derived from the general
principle. Clear rules are never unnecessary, especially when they are
appended to principles that are so general as to encompass practically
everything. In handling a principle of that kind a conscientious court
may hesitate or perhaps abstain from deriving one consequence more
because of a feeling that the scope of the principle would be thereby
exceeded. The enactment of a clear rule relieves the judicial conscience
of that kind of scruple without doing violence to the general principle.
In the second place, however, the new article of the Louisiana Civil
Code subtracts induced reliance form the quasi-delictual field and places
it where it belongs, in contract. Indeed, to turn an unfulfilled promise
into a quasi-delict for the purpose of justifying recovery is a method
as roundabout as forcing a gift into the frame of an onerous contract
142. See La. Civ. Code art. 1893 (1870) and La. Civ. Code art. 1966 comment (b).
See also Expose des motifs 35 (West's Special Pamphlet, 1986).
143. See I S. Litvinoff, Obligations § 282, at 501, n.42, in 6 Louisiana Civil Law
Treatise (1969); Comment, Promissory Estoppel and Louisiana, 31 La. L. Rev. 84 (1970);
G. Gilmore, The Death of Contract (1974). See also Snyder, Promissory Estoppel as Tort,
35 Iowa L. Rev. 28 (1949).
144. See French Civ. Code art. 1382 and La. Civ. Code art. 2315.
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for the sake of protecting the interest of an unfairly disappointed prom-
isee. As in the case of an obligor who fails to perform a valid con-
ventional obligation, the realm of contract is more hospitable than the
realm of tort to the case of a promise which is not fulfilled because
the promisor pretends that he is not bound even though his promise
induced the other party to rely on it to his detriment.
The question may be raised whether detrimental reliance is a true
cause for an obligation since neither the promisee's reliance nor his
detriment seems to originate in the promisor's intent 4 The answer is
that, though the promisee's detrimental reliance is certainly not a motive
of the promisor, it is, however, a reason why he should be bound. In
the new article of the Louisiana Civil Code, thus, induced reliance is
another instance of the cause raisonable et juste that some French'
decisions have asserted as grounds for the enforceability of a promise.
145. See Herman, supra note 108, at 720.
